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Abstract
We present a simple model of a stock market where a random
communication structure between agents generically gives rise to a
heavy tails in the distribution of stock price variations in the form of an
exponentially truncated power-law, similar to distributions observed
in recent empirical studies of high frequency market data. Our model
provides a link between two well-known market phenomena: the heavy
tails observed in the distribution of stock market returns on one hand
and ’herding’ behavior in financial markets on the other hand. In
particular, our study suggests a relation between the excess kurtosis
observed in asset returns, the market order flow and the tendency of
market participants to imitate each other.
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Empirical studies of the fluctuations in the price of various financial assets
have shown that distributions of stock returns and stock price changes have
fat tails that deviate from the Gaussian distribution [38, 39, 12, 27, 42, 14, 43]
especially for intraday time scales [14]. These fat tails, characterized by a
significant excess kurtosis, persist even after accounting for heteroskedasticity
in the data [9]. The heavy tails observed in these distributions correspond
to large fluctuations in prices, ”bursts” of volatility which are difficult to
explain only in terms of variations in fundamental economic variables [47].
The fact that significative fluctuations in prices are not necesarily related
to the arrival of information [16] or to variations in fundamental economic
variables [47] leads to think the high variability present in stock market
returns may correspond to collective phenomena such as crowd effects or
”herd” behavior.
Although herding in financial markets is by now relatively well docu-
mented empirically, there have been few theoretical studies on the implica-
tions of herding and imitation for the statistical properties of market demand
and price fluctuations. In particular some questions one would like to an-
swer is: how does the presence of herding modify the distribution of returns?
What are the implications of herding for relations between market variables
such as order flow and price variability? These are some of the questions
which have motivated our study.
The aim of the present study is to examine, in the framework of a sim-
ple model, how the existence of herd behavior among market participants
may generically lead to large fluctuations in the aggregate excess demand,
described by a heavy-tailed non-Gaussian distribution. Furthermore we ex-
plore how empirically measurable quantities such as the excess kurtosis of
returns and the average order flow may be related to each other in the con-
text of our model. Our approach provides a quantitative link between the two
issues discussed above: the heavy tails observed in the distribution of stock
market returns on one hand and the herd behavior observed in financial
markets on the other hand.
The article is divided into four sections. Section 1 reviews well known empir-
ical facts about the heavy-tailed nature of the distribution of stock returns
and various models proposed to account for it. Section 2 presents previous
empirical and theoretical work on herding and imitation in financial markets
in relation to the present study. Section 3 discusses the statistical proper-
ties of excess demand resulting from the aggregation of of a large number of
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random individual demands in a market. Section 4 defines our model and
presents analytical results. Section 5 interprets the results in economic terms,
compares them to empirical data and discusses possible extensions. Details
of calculations are given in the appendices.
1 The heavy-tailed nature of asset return dis-
tributions
It is by now a well known fact that the distribution of returns of almost all
financial assets -stocks, indexes and futures- exhibit a slow asymptotic decay
that deviates from a normal distribution. This is quantitatively reflected in
the excess kurtosis, defined as:
κ =
µ4
σ4
− 3 (1)
where µ4 is the fourth central moment and σ the standard deviation of the
returns. κ should be zero for a normal distribution but ranges between 2 and
50 for daily returns [12, 43] and is even higher for intraday data. Careful
study of the tails of the distribution shows an exponential decay for most
assets [14, 40].
Many statistical models have been put forth to account for the heavy
tails observed in the distribution of asset returns. Well known examples
are Mandelbrot’s stable paretian hypothesis [38] the mixture of distributions
hypothesis [13], and models based on conditional heteroskedasticity [18].
It is well known that in the presence of heteroskedasticity, the uncondi-
tional distribution of returns will have heavy tails. In most models based
on heteroskedasticity, the process of return is assumed to be conditionally
Gaussian : the shocks are ”locally” Gaussian and the non-Gaussian character
of the unconditional distribution is an effect of aggregation. It is obtained
by superposing a large number of local Gaussian shocks. In this description,
sudden movements in prices are interpreted as corresponding to a high value
of conditional variance.
On one hand, it has been shown that although conditional heteroskedas-
ticity does lead to fat-tails in unconditional distributions, ARCH-type models
cannot fully account for the kurtosis of returns [29, 9]. On the other hand,
from a theoretical point of view there is no a priori reason to postulate that
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returns are conditionally normal: although conditional normality is conve-
nient for parameter estimation of the resulting model, non-normal conditional
distributions possess the same qualitative features as for volatility clustering
while accounting better for heavy tails. Gallant and Tauchen [23] report
significant evidence of both conditional heteroskedasticity and conditional
non-normality in the daily NYSE value-weighted index. Similarly, Engle and
Gonzalez-Rivera [17] show that when a GARCH(1,1) model is used for the
conditional variance of stock returns the conditional distribution has consid-
erable kurtosis, especially for small firm stocks. Indeed several authors have
proposed GARCH-type models with non-normal conditional distributions [9].
Stable distributions [38] offer an elegant alternative to heteroskedasticity
for generating fat tails, with the advantage that they have a natural interpre-
tation in terms of aggregation of a large number of individual contributions
of agents to market fluctuations: indeed, stable distribution may be obtained
as limit distributions of sums of independent or weakly dependent random
variables, a property which is not shared by alternative models. Unfortu-
nately, the infinite variance property of these distributions is not observed
in empirical data: sample variances do not increase indefinitely with sample
size but appear to stabilize at a certain value for large enough data sets. We
will discuss stable distributions in more detail in Section 3.
A third approach, first advocated by Clark [13], is to model stock re-
turns by a subordinated process, typically subordinated Brownian motion.
This amounts to stipulating that through a “stochastic time change” one
can transform the complicated dynamics of the price process into Brownian
motion or some other simple process. It can be shown that, depending on
the choice of the subordinator, one can obtain a wide range of distributions
for the increments all of which possess heavy tails i.e. positive excess kur-
tosis. As a matter of fact, even stable distributions may be obtained as a
subordinated Brownian motion. In the original approach of Clark [13], the
subordinator was taken to be trading volume. Other choices which have
been proposed are the number of trades [24] or other local measures of mar-
ket activity. However, none of these choices for the subordinator lead to a
normal distribution for the increments of the time-changed process, indicat-
ing that large fluctuations in price may not be completely explained by large
fluctuations in trading volume or number of trades.
In short, although heteroskedasticity and time deformation partly explain
the kurtosis of asset returns, they do not explain it quantitatively: even after
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accounting for these effects, one is left with an important residual kurtosis
in the resulting transformed time series. Moreover, these approaches are not
based on any particular model of the market phenomenon generating the
data that they attempt to describe.
Recent works by Bak, Paczuski and Shubik [3] and Caldarelli, Marsili
and Zhang [11] have tried to explain the heavy tailed nature of return distri-
butions as an emergent property in a market where fundamentalist traders
interact with noise traders. Bak, Paczuski and Shubik consider several types
of trading rules and study the resulting statistical properties for the time
series of asset prices in each case. Computer simulations of their model do
seem to yield fat-tailed distributions for asset returns which at least quali-
tatively resemble empirical distributions of stock returns, showing that the
appearance of fat-tailed distributions can be regarded as an emergent prop-
erty in large markets. However, the model has two drawbacks: first, it is
a fairly complicated model with many ingredients and parameters and it is
difficult to see how each ingredient of the model affects the results obtained,
which in turn diminishes its explanatory power. Second, the complexity of
the model does not allow explicit calculations to be performed, preventing
the model parameters to be compared with empirical values.
We present here an alternative approach which, by modeling the com-
munication structure between market agents as a random graph, proposes
a simple mechanism accounting for some non-trivial statistical properties of
stock price fluctuations. Although much more rudimentary and containing
fewer ingredients than the model proposed by Bak, Paczuski and Shubik, our
model allows for analytic calculations to be performed, thus enabling us to
interpret in economic terms the role of each of the parameters introduced.
The basic intuition behind our approach is simple: interaction of market
participants through imitation can lead to large fluctuations in aggregate
demand, leading to heavy tails in the distribution of returns.
2 Herd behavior in financial markets
A number of recent studies have considered mimetic behavior as a possible ex-
planation for the excessive volatility observed in financial markets [5, 47, 49].
The existence of herd behavior in speculative markets has been documented
by a certain number of studies: Scharfstein and Stein [44] discuss evidence of
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herding in the behavior of fund managers, Grinblatt et al. [26] report herding
in mutual fund behavior while Trueman [50] and Welch [51] show evidence
for herding in the forecasts made by financial analysts.
On the theoretical side several studies have shown that, in a market with
noise traders, herd behavior is not necessarily “irrational” in the sense that
it may be compatible with optimizing behavior of the agents [48]. Other
motivations may be invoked for explaining imitation in markets, such as
”group pressure” [6, 44].
Various models of herd behavior have been considered in the literature,
the most well known approach being that of Bannerjee [4, 5] and Bikhchan-
dani et al. [6]. In these models, individuals attempt to infer a parameter
from noisy observations and decisions of other agents, typically through a
Bayesian procedure, giving rise to ”information cascades” [6]. An important
feature of these models is the sequential character of the dynamics: individ-
uals make their decisions one at a time, taking into account the decisions
of the individuals preceding them. The model therefore assumes a natu-
ral way of ordering the agents. This assumption seems unrealistic in the
case of financial markets: orders from various market participants enter the
market simultaneously and it is the interplay between different orders that
determines aggregate market variables2.
Non-sequential herding has been studied in a Bayesian setting by Orle´an
[41] in a framework inspired by the Ising model. Orle´an considers imitation
between agents in which any two agents have the same tendency to imitate
each other. In terms of aggregate variables, this model leads either to a
Gaussian distribution when the imitation is weak, or to a bimodal distri-
bution with non-zero modes, which Orle´an interprets as corresponding to
collective market phenomena such as crashes or panics. In neither case does
one obtain a heavy-tailed unimodal distribution centered at zero such as
those observed for stock returns.
The approach proposed in this paper is different from both approaches
described above. Our model is different from that in [4, 6]. in that herding
is not sequential. The unrealistic nature of the results in [41] result from the
fact that all agents are assumed to imitate each other to the same degree.
2Bikhchandani et al [6] do not consider their model as applicable to financial markets
but for another reason: they remark that as the herd grows, the cost of joining it will also
grow, discouraging new agents to join. This aspect, which is not taken into account by
their model, is again unavoidable to the sequential character of herd formation.
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We avoid this problem by considering the random formation of groups of
agent who imitate each other but such that different groups of agents make
independent decisions, which allows for a heterogeneous market structure.
More specifically, our approach considers the interactions between agents as
resulting from a random communication structure, as explained below.
3 Aggregation of random individual demands
Consider a stock market with N agents, labeled by an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
trading in a single asset, whose price at time t will be denoted x(t). During
each time period, an agent may choose either to buy the stock, sell it or
not to trade. The demand for stock of agent i is represented by a random
variable φi, which can take the values 0, -1 or +1: a positive value of φi
represents a ”bull”- an agent willing to buy stock-, a negative value a ”bear”,
eager to sell stock while φi = 0 means that agent i does not trade during
a given period. The random character of individual demands may be due
either to heterogeneous preferences or to random resources of the agents,
or both. Alternatively, it may result from the application by the agents of
simple decision rules, each group of agents using a certain rule. However,
in order to focus on the effect of herding, we do not explicitly model the
decision process leading to the individual demands and model the result of
the decision process as a random variable φi. In contrast with many binary
choice models in the microeconomics literature, we allow for an agent to be
inactive i.e. not to trade during a given time period t. This, as we shall see
below, is important for deriving our results.
Let us consider for simplification that, during each time period, an agent
may either trade one unit of the asset or remain inactive. The demand of
the agent i is then represented by φi ∈ {−1, 0,+1}, φi = −1 representing a
sell order. The aggregate excess demand for the asset at time t is therefore
simply
D(t) =
N∑
i=1
φi(t) (2)
given the algebraic nature of the φi. The marginal distribution of agent
is individual demand will is assumed to be symmetric :
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P (φi = +1) = P (φi = −1) = a P (φi = 0) = 1− 2a
such that the average aggregate excess demand is zero i.e. the market is
considered to fluctuate around equilibrium. A value of a < 1/2 allows for a
finite fraction of agents not to trade during a given period.
We are concerned here with obtaining a result which could then be com-
pared with actual market data and the short term excess demand is not an
easily observable quantity. Also, most of the studies on the statistical prop-
erties of financial time series have been done on returns, log returns or price
changes. We therefore need to relate the aggregate excess demand in a given
period to the return or price change during that period. The aggregate excess
demand has an impact on the price of the stock, causing it to rise if the excess
demand is positive, to fall if it is negative. A common specification, which is
compatible with standard tatonnement ideas, is to assume a proportionality
between price change (or return) and excess demand:
∆x = x(t+ 1)− x(t) =
1
λ
N∑
i=1
φi(t) (3)
where λ is a factor measuring the liquidity or, more precisely, the market
depth [32]: it is the excess demand needed to move the price by one unit: it
measure the sensitivity of price to fluctuations in demand. Eq. (3), empha-
sizes the price impact of the order flow as opposed to other possible causes for
price fluctuations. Eq.(3) may be considered either in absolue terms with x(t)
being the price, or as representing relative variations of the price, x(t) then
being considered as the log of the price and its increment as the instantaneous
return. The latter has the advantage of guaranteeing the positivity of the
price but for short-run dynamics the two specifications do not differ substan-
tially since the two quantities have the same empirical properties. A similar
model for the price impact of trades has been considered by Hausman, Lo and
MacKinlay [28]. Although in the long run economic factors other than short
term excess demand may influence the evolution of the asset price, resulting
in mean-reversion or more complex types of behavior, we focus here on the
short-run behavior of prices, for example on intra-day time scales in the case
of stock markets, so this approximation seems reasonable. The linear nature
of this relation may also be questioned: indeed, some empirical studied seem
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to indicate that the price impact of trades may be non-linear [12, 32]. First,
note that these studies deal with the price impact of trades and not of order
flow (excess demand), which is much harder to measure. Results reported
by Farmer and co-workers [21] based on the study of the price impact of
blocks of orders of different sizes sent to the market seem to indicate a linear
relationship for small price changes with nonlinearity arising when the size
of blocks is increased. Moreover, if the one-period return ∆x is a non-linear
but smooth function h(D) 3 of the excess demand, then a linearization of the
inverse demand function h (a first order Taylor expansion in D) shows that
Eq.(3) still holds for small fluctuations of the aggregate excess demand with
h′(0) = 1/λ.
In order to evaluate the distribution of stock returns from Eq.(3), we
need to know the joint distribution of the individual demands (φi(t))1≤i≤N .
Let us begin by considering the simplest case where individual demands φi
of different agents are independent identically distributed random variables.
We shall refer to this hypothesis as the ”independent agents” hypothesis.
In this case the joint distribution of the individual demands is simply the
product of individual distributions and the price variation ∆x is a sum of
N iid random variables with finite variance. When the number of terms in
Eq.(3) is large the central limit theorem applied to the sum in Eq.(3) tells us
that the distribution of ∆x is well approximated by a Gaussian distribution.
Of course, this result still holds as long as the distribution of individual
demands has finite variance.
This can be seen as a rationale for the frequent use of the normal distribu-
tion as a model for the distribution of stock returns: indeed, if the variation
of market price is seen as the sum of a large number of independent or weakly
dependent random effects, it is plausible that a Gaussian description should
be a good one.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence tells us otherwise: the distributions
both of asset returns [43, 12] and of asset price changes [38, 39, 14, 15] have
been repeatedly shown to deviate significantly from the Gaussian distribu-
tion, exhibiting fat tails and excess kurtosis.
But the independent agent model is also capable of generating aggregate
3It is interesting to note that if ∆x = h(D), where h is an increasing function of D
and if the individual demands (φi(t)) are sequences of independent random variables (a
somewhat extreme assumption), then it is easy to show that the overall wealth of all
traders increases on average with time.
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distributions with heavy tails: indeed, if one relaxes the assumption that
the individual demands φi have a finite variance then under the hypothesis
of independence (or weak dependence) of individual demands, the aggregate
demand -and therefore the price change if we assume Eq.(3)- will have a stable
(Pareto-Le´vy) distribution. This is a possible interpretation for the stable-
Paretian model proposed by Mandelbrot [38] for the heavy tails observed
in the distribution of the increments of various market prices. The infinite
variance of the φi then reflects the heterogeneity of the market, for example
in terms of broad distribution of wealth of the participants as proposed by
Levy & Solomon [37].
Mandelbrot’s stable-Paretian hypothesis has been criticized for several
reasons, one of them being that it predicts an infinite variance for stock
returns which implies in practice that the sample variance will indefinitely
increase with sample size, a property which is not observed in empirical data.
More precisely, a careful study of the tails of the distribution of increments
for various financial assets shows [10, 14] that they have heavy tails with a
finite variance. Many distributions verify these conditions [12]; a particular
example proposed by the authors and others [14] is an exponentially trun-
cated stable distribution the tails of the density then have the asymptotic
form of an exponentially truncated power law:
p(∆x) ∼
|∆x|→∞
C
|∆x|1+µ
exp (−
∆x
∆x0
) (4)
The exponent µ is found to be close to 1.5 (µ ≃ 1.4 − 1.6) for a wide
variety of stocks and market indexes [10]. This asymptotic form allows for
heavy tails (excess kurtosis) without implying infinite variance.
However, it is known the central limit theorem also holds for certain se-
quences of dependent variables: under various types of mixing conditions [7],
which are mathematical formulations of the notion of “weak” dependence,
aggregate variables will still be normally distributed. Therefore the non-
Gaussian and more generally non-stable character of empirical distributions,
be it excess demand or the stock returns, not only demonstrates the failure of
the “independent agent” approach, but also shows that such an approach is
not anywhere close to being a good approximation: the dependence between
individual demands is an essential character of the market structure and may
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not be left out in the aggregation procedure, they cannot be assumed to be
”weak” (in the sense of a mixing condition [7]) and do change the distribution
of the resulting aggregate variable,
Indeed, the assumption that the outcomes of decisions of individual agents
may be represented as independent random variables is highly unrealistic:
such an assumption ignores an essential ingredient of market organization,
namely the interaction and communication among agents.
In real markets, agents may form groups of various sizes which then may
share information and act in coordination. In the context of a financial
market, groups of traders may align their decisions and act in unison to buy
or sell; a different interpretation of a ”group” may be an investment fund
corresponding to the wealth of several investors but managed by a single
fund manager.
In order to capture such effects we need to introduce an additional in-
gredient, namely the communication structure between agents. One solution
would be to specify a fixed trading group structure and then proceed to
study the resulting aggregate fluctuations. Such an approach has two major
drawbacks. First, a realistic market structure may require specifying a com-
plicated structure of clusters and rendering the resulting model analytically
intractable. More importantly, the resulting pattern of aggregate fluctuations
will crucially depend on the specification of the market structure.
An alternative approach, suggested by Kirman [33], is to consider the
market communication structure itself as stochastic. One way of generating
a random market structure is to assume that market participants meet ran-
domly and trades take place when an agent willing to buy meets and agent
willing to sell. This procedure, called ”random matching” by some authors
[30], has been previously considered in the context of formation of trading
groups by Ioannides [30] and in the context of a stock market model by Bak,
Paczuski and Shubik [3]. Another way is to consider that market partici-
pants form groups or“clusters” through a random matching process but that
no trading takes places inside a given group: instead, members of a given
group adopt a common market strategy (for example, they decide to buy or
sell or not to trade) and different groups may trade with each other through
a centralized market process. In the context of a financial market, clusters
may represent for example a group of investors participating in a mutual
fund. This is the line we will follow in this paper.
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4 Presentation of the model
More precisely, let us suppose that agents group together in coalitions or
clusters and that, once a coalition has formed, all it’s members coordinate
their individual demands so that all individuals in a given cluster have the
same belief regarding future movements of the asset price. In the framework
described in the preceding section, we will consider that all agents belonging
to a given cluster will have the same demand φi for the stock. In the context of
a stock market, these clusters may correspond for example to mutual funds
e.g. portfolios managed by the same fund manager or to herding among
security analysts as in [50, 51]. The right hand side of the equation (3) may
therefore be rewritten as a sum over clusters :
∆x =
1
λ
k∑
α=1
Wαφα(t) =
1
λ
nc∑
α=1
Xα (5)
where Wα is the size of cluster α, φα(t) the (common) individual demand
of agents belonging to the cluster α, nc the number of clusters (coalitions)
and Xα = φαWα.
One may consider that coalitions are formed through binary links between
agents, a link between two agents meaning that they undertake the same
action on the market i.e. they both buy or sell stock. For any pair of agents
i and j, let pij be the probability that i and j are linked together. Again, in
order to simplify, we assume that pij = p is independent of i and j: all links
are equally probable. (N − 1)p then denotes the average number of agents a
given agent is linked to. Since we are interested in studying the N →∞ limit,
p should therefore be chosen in such a way that (N − 1)p has a finite limit.
A natural choice is pij = c/N , any other choice verifying the above condition
being asymptotically equivalent to this one. The distribution of coalition
sizes in the market is thus completely specified by a single parameter, c,
which represents the willingness of agents to align their actions: it can be
interpreted as a coordination number, measuring the degree of clustering
among agents.
Such a structure is known as a random graph in the mathematical litera-
ture [19, 8]: in terms of random graph theory, we consider agents as vertices
of a random graph of size N , and the coalitions as connected components
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of the graph. Such an approach to communication in markets using ran-
dom graphs was first suggested in the economics literature by Kirman [33]
to study the properties of the core of a large economy. Random graphs have
also been used in the context of multilateral matching in search problems by
Ioannides [30]. A good review of the applications of random graph theory in
economic modeling is given in [31].
The properties of large random graphs in the N → ∞ limit were first
studied by Erdo¨s and Renyi [19]. An extensive review of mathematical results
on random graphs is given in [8]. The main resullts of the combinatorial
approach are given in Appendix 1. One can show [8] that for c = 1 the
probability density for the cluster size distribution decreases asymptotically
as a power law:
P (W ) ∼
W→∞
A
W 5/2
while for values of c close to and smaller than 1 ( 0 < 1 − c << 1), the
cluster size distribution is cut off by an exponential tail:
P (W ) ∼
W→∞
A
W 5/2
exp(−
(c− 1)W
W0
) (6)
For c=1, the distribution has an infinite variance while for c < 1 the
variance becomes finite because of the exponential tail. In this case the
average size of a coalition is of order 1/(1 − c) and the average number of
clusters is then of order N(1− c/2).
Setting the coordination parameter c close to 1 means that each agent
tends to establish a link with one other agent, which can be regarded as a
reasonable assumption. This does not rule out the formation of large coali-
tions through successive binary links between agents but prevents a single
agent from forming multiple links, as would be the case in a centralized com-
munication structure where one agent (the ”auctioneer”) is linked to all the
others. As argued by Kirman [33] the presence of a Walrasian auctioneer cor-
responds to such ’star-like’, centralized, communication structures. We are
thus excluding such a situation by construction: we are interested in a mar-
ket where information is distributed and not centralized, which corresponds
more closely to the situations encountered in real markets. More precisely,
the local structure of the market may be characterized by the following result
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[8]: in the limit N → ∞, the number νi of neighbors of a given agent i is a
Poisson random variable with parameter c:
P (νi = ν) = e
−c c
ν
ν!
(7)
A Walrasian auctioneer w would be connected to every other agent: νw =
N − 1. The probability for having a Walrasian auctioneer is therefore given
by NP (νw = N − 1) which goes to zero when N →∞.
A given market cluster is characterized by its size Wα and its ’nature’ i.e.
whether the members are buyers or sellers. This is specified by a variable
φα ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. It is reasonable to assume that Wα and φα are independent
random variables: the size of a group does not influence its decision whether
to buy or sell. The variable Xα = φαWα is then symmetrically distributed
with a mass of 1− 2a at the origin. Let
F (x) = P (Xα ≤ x|Xα 6= 0) (8)
Then the distribution of Xα is given by
G(x) = P (Xα ≤ x) = (1− 2a)H(x) + 2aF (x) (9)
whereH is a unit step function at 0 (Heaviside function). We shall assume
that F has a continuous density, f . f then decays asymptotically as in (6):
f(x) ∼
|x|→∞
A
|x|5/2
e
−(c−1)|x|
W0 (10)
The expression for the price variation ∆x therefore reduces to a sum of
nc iid random variables Xα, α = 1..nc with heavy-tailed distributions as in
(6):
∆x =
1
λ
nc∑
α=1
Xα
Since the probability density of Xα has a finite mass 1−2a at zero, only a
fraction 2a of the terms in the sum (5) are non-zero; the number of non-zero
terms in the sum is of order 2anc ∼ 2aN(1 − c/2) = Norder(1 − c/2) where
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Norder = 2aN is the average number of market participants who actively trade
in the market during a given period. For example, Norder can be thought of
as the number of orders received during the time period [t, t+1] if we assume
that different orders correspond to net demands, as defined above, of different
clusters of agents. For a time period of, say, 15 minutes on a liquid market
such as NYSE, Norder = 100− 1000 is a typical order of magnitude.
The distribution of the price variation δx is then given by
P (∆x = x) =
N∑
k=1
P (nc = k)
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
(2a)j(1− 2a)k−jf⊗j(λx) (11)
where ⊗ denotes a convolution product, nc being the number of clusters.
The above equation enables us to calculate the moment generating functions
F of the aggregate excess demand D in terms of f˜ (see Appendix 3 for
details):
F(z) ∼
N→∞
exp[Norder(1−
c
2
)(f˜(z)− 1)] (12)
The moments of D (and those of ∆x) may now be obtained through a
Taylor expansion of Eq.(12) (see Appendix 4 for details). The calculation of
the variance and the fourth moment yields:
µ2(D) = Norder(1−
c
2
)µ2(Xα) (13)
µ4(D) = Norder(1−
c
2
)µ4(Xα) + 3N
2
order(1−
c
2
)2µ2(Xα)
2 (14)
An interesting quantity is the kurtosis of the asset returns which, in our
model, is equal to the kurtosis of excess demand κ(D):
κ(D) =
µ4(Xα)
Norder(1−
c
2
)µ2(Xα)
The moments µj(Xα) may be obtained may be obtained by an expansion
in 1/N where N is the number of agents in the market (see Appendix 2).
Substituting their expression on the above formula yields the kurtosis κ(D)
as a function of c and the order flow:
κ(D) =
2c+ 1
Norder(1−
c
2
)A(c)(1− c)3
(15)
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where A(c) is a normalization constant with a value close to 1 defined
in Appendix 2, tending to a finite limit as c → 1. This relation may be
interpreted as follows: a reduction in the volume of the order flow results in
larger price fluctuations, characterized by a larger excess kurtosis. This result
corresponds to the well known fact that large price fluctuations are more
likely to occur in less active markets, characterized by a smaller order flow.
It is also consistent with results from various market microstructure models
where a larger order flow enables easier regulation of supply and demand
by the market maker. It is interesting that we find the same qualitative
feature here although we have not explicitly integrated a market maker in
our model. This result should be compared to the observation in [17] that,
even after accounting for heteroskedasticity, the conditional distribution of
stock returns for small firms is higher than that of large firms. Small firm
stocks being characterized by a smaller order flow Norder, this observation is
compatible with our results.
More importantly, Eq. (15) shows that the kurtosis can be very large
even if the number of orders is itself large, provided c is close to 1. Since
A(1) is close to 1/2, one finds that even for c = 0.9 and Norder = 1000, the
kurtosis κ is still of order 10, as observed on very active markets on time
intervals of tens of minutes. Actually, one can show that provided 2aN is
not too large, the asymptotic behaviour of P (∆x) is still of form given by
Eq. (6). This model thus leads naturally to the value of µ = 3/2, close to
the value observed on real markets. Of course, the value of c could itself be
time dependent. For example, herding tendency tends to be stronger during
periods of uncertainty, leading to an increase in the kurtosis. When c reaches
one, a finite fraction of the market shares simultaneously the same opinion
and this leads to a crash. An interesting extension of the model would be
one in which the time evolution of the market structure is explicitly modeled,
and the possible feedback effect of the price moves on the behavior of market
participants.
5 Discussion
We have exhibited a model of a stock market which, albeit its simplicity, gives
rise to a non-trivial probability distribution for aggregate excess demand and
stock price variations, similar to empirical distributions of asset returns. Our
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model illustrates the fact that while a naive market model in which agents do
not interact with each other would tend to give rise to normally distributed
aggregate fluctuations, taking into account interaction between market par-
ticipants through a rudimentary ’herding’ mechanism gives a result which is
quantitatively comparable to empirical findings on the distribution of stock
market returns.
One of the interesting results of our model is that it predicts a relation
between the fatness of the tails of asset returns as measured by their excess
kurtosis and the degree of herding among market participants as measured
by the parameter c. This relation is given by Eq.(15) .
Although we implicitly assumed that t represents chronological time, one
could formulate the model by considering t as “market time”, leading to
a subordinated process in real time as in [13], with the difference that the
underlying process will not be a Gaussian random walk.
Our model raises several interesting questions. As remarked above, the
value of c is specified as being less than, and close to 1. “Fine-tuning” a
parameter to a certain value may seem arbitrary unless one can justify such
an assumption. An interesting extension of the model would be one in which
the time evolution of the market structure is explicitly modeled in such a
way that the parameter c remains in the critical region (close to 1).
One approach to this problem is via the concept of ”self-organized crit-
icality”, introduced by Bak et al [2]: certain dynamical systems generically
evolve to a state where the parameters converge to the critical values lead-
ing to scaling laws and heavy-tailed distributions for the quantities modeled.
This state is reached asymptotically and is an attractor for the dynamics
of the system. Bak, Chen, Scheinkman and Woodford [1] present a simple
model of an economic system presenting self-organized criticality.
Note however that, for the above results to hold, one does not need to
adjust c to a critical value : it is sufficient for c to be within a certain range of
values. As noted above, when c approaches 1 the clusters become larger and
larger and a giant coalition appears when c ≥ 1. In our model the activation
of such a cluster would correspond to a market crash (or boom). In order
to be realistic, the dynamics of c should be such that the crash (or boom)
is not a stable state and the giant cluster disaggregates shortly after it is
formed: after a short period of panic, the market resumes normal activity.
In mathematical terms, one should specify the dynamics of c(t) such that the
value c = 1 is ’repulsive’. This can be achieved by introducing a feedback
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effect of prices on the behavior of market participants: a nonlinear coupling
between can lead to a control mechanism maintaining c in the critical region.
Yet another interesting dynamical specification compatible with our model
is obtained by considering agents with ”threshold response”. Threshold mod-
els have been previously considered as possible origins for collective phenom-
ena in economic systems [25]. One can introduce heterogeneity by allowing
the individual threshold θi to be random variables: for example one may
assume the θis to be iid with a standard deviation σ(θ). A simple way to
introduce interactions among agents is through an aggregate variable: each
agent observes the aggregate excess demand D(t) given by Eq.(2) or even-
tually D(t) + E(t), where E is an exogeneous variable. Agents then evolve
as follows: at each time step, an agents changes its market position φ(t)
(“flips” from long to short or vice versa) if the observed signal D(t) crosses
his/her threshold θi. Aggregate fluctuations can then occur through cascades
or “avalanches” corresponding to the flipping of market positions of groups
of agents. This model has been studied in the context of physical systems
by Sethna et al [46] who have shown that for a fairly wide range of values
of σ(θ) one observes aggregate fluctuations whose distribution has power-law
behavior with exponential tails, as in Eq.(6).
These issues will be adressed in a forthcoming work.
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• Appendices:
Unless specified otherwise, f(N, c) ∼ g(N, c) means
f(N, c)
g(N, c)
= 1 + o
N→∞
(1)
uniformly in c on all compact subsets of ]0,1[.
• Appendix 1: some results from random graph theory
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In this appendix we will review some results on asymptotic properties of
large random graphs. Proofs for most of the results may be found in [19] or
[8].
Consider N labeled points V1, V2, ...VN , called vertices. A link (or edge) is
defined as an unordered pair {i,j }. A graph is defined by a set V of vertices
and a set E of edges. Any two vertices may either be linked by one edge or
not be linked at all. In the language of graph theory, we will consider non-
oriented graphs without parallel edges. We shall always denote the number
of vertices by N . A path is defined as a finite sequence of links such that every
two consecutive edges and only these have a common vertex. Vertices along
a path may be labeled in two ways, thus enabling to define the extremities
of the path. A graph is said to be connected if any two vertices Vi, Vj are
linked by a path i.e. there exists a path with Vi and Vj as extremities. A
cycle (or loop) is defined as a path such that the extremities coincide. A
graph is called a tree if it is connected and if none of its subgraphs is a cycle.
A graph is called acyclic if all its subgraphs are trees.
Consider now a graph built by choosing, for each pair of vertices Vi, Vj
whether to link them or not through a random process, the probability for
selecting any given edge being p > 0, the decisions for different edges being
independent. A graph obtained by such a procedure is termed a random
graph of type G(N, p) in the notations of [8]4.
In the following, we will be specifically interested in the case p = c/N .
Various graph-theoretical parameters of such graphs are random variables
whose distributions only depends on N and c. We shall be particularly
interested in the properties of large random graphs of this type i.e. G(N, c/N)
in the limit N →∞.
The following results have been shown by Erdo¨s and Renyi [19] and Bol-
lobas [8]: If c < 1 then in the limit N → ∞ all point of the random graphs
belong to trees except for a finite number U of vertices which belong to
unicyclic components. Moreover, the probability of a vertex belonging to
a cyclic component tends to zero as N−1/3. For describing the structure of
large random graphs for c < 1 it is therefore sufficient to account for vertices
belonging to trees; cyclic components do not essentially modify the results,
except when c = 1.
4This definition corresponds to random graphs of type Γ∗∗n,N in [19] (see [19],p. 20).
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More precisely ( [8], Theorem V.22)
U ∼
1
2
∞∑
k=3
(ce−c)k
k−3∑
j=0
kj
j!
σ2(U) ∼
1
2
∞∑
k=3
k(ce−c)k
k−3∑
j=0
kj
j!
The above expressions are valid for c 6= 1.
•Appendix 2: Distribution of cluster sizes in a large random
graph
Let p1(s) be the probability for a given vertex to belong to a cluster of
size s in the N →∞ limit. The moment generating function Φ1 of the p1 is
defined by :
Φ1(z) =
∞∑
s=1
eszp1(s)
We shall now proceed to derive a functional equation verified by Φ1 in
the large N limit when the effect of loops (cycles) are neglected.
Let p1N (s) be the corresponding probability in a random graph with N
vertices. Adding a new vertex to the graph will modify the pattern of links,
the probability of k new links from the new vertex to the old ones being
(c/N)k(1− c/N)N−k
(
N
k
)
. As shown above (Appendix 1) the probability
of creating a cycle tends to zero for large N . The constraint that no new
cycles are created by the new links imposes that the k links are made to
vertices in k different clusters of sizes. If s1, s2, ...sk are the sizes of these
clusters, the new links will create a new cluster of size s1 + s2 + ...+ sk + 1.
p1N+1(s) =
N∑
k=1
N∑
s1,...,sk=1
(
N
k
)
(
c
N
)k(1−
c
N
)N−kδ(s1+s2+...+sk+1−s)p
1
N (s1)p
1
N(s2)...p
1
N (sk)
Multiplying both sides by esz and summing over s gives:
Φ1(z,N + 1) = e
z[1 +
c
N
+ Φ1(z,N)
c
N
]N
which gives in the large N limit:
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Φ1(z) = e
z+c(Φ1(z)−1)
from which various moments and cumulants may be calculated recur-
sively. The distribution of clusters sizes p(s) is then given by
p(s) = A(c)
p1(s)
s
where A(c) is a normalizing constant defined such that
∫
p(s)ds = 1.
• Appendix 3: Number of clusters in a large random graph
Let nc(N) be the number of clusters ( connected components) in a random
graph of size N defined as above. nc is a random variable whose characteristics
depend on N and the parameter c. In this section we will show that nc has
an asymptotic normal distribution when N → ∞ and that for large N , the
j-th cumulant Cj of of nc is given by:
Cj ∼
N→∞
(−1)jNc
2
From a well known generalization of Euler’s theorem in graph theory
l(N)−N + nc(N) = χ(N)
where χ(N) is the number of independent cycles and l(N) the number of
links. This implies in turn
nc(N) = N(1−
c
2
) +O(1)
We shall retrieve this result below, and proceed to calculate higher moments
via an approximation. Define the moment generating function for the vari-
able nc(N) to be
ΦN(z, c) = encz =
N∑
k=1
PN,c(nc = k)e
kz
The j-th moment of nc is then given by:
ncj =
∂jφN
∂zj
(0, c)
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Let us also consider the cumulant generating function Ψ defined by Φ(z) =
expΨ(z). The j-th cumulant of the distribution of nc may then be calculated
as
Cj(N, c) =
∂jΨN
∂zj
(0, c)
We will now establish an approximate recursion relation between ΦN and
ΦN+1. Take a random graph of size N , the probability of a link between any
two vertices being p = c/N . In order to obtain a graph with N + 1 vertices,
add a new vertex and choose randomly the links between the new vertex
and the others. Note that since in a graph of size N the link probability
is pN = c/N , our new graph will correspond to a graph of size N + 1 with
parameter c′ = c(N +1)/N so that the link probability is c′/(N +1) = c/N .
We will assume that the probability of two links being made to the same
cluster is negligible i.e. that no cycles are created by the new links, which
is a reasonable approximation given the results in Appendix 1. In this case,
each k links emanating from the new vertex will diminish the number of
clusters by k − 1, giving the following recursion relation:
PN+1,c′(n) = (1−
c
N
)NPN+1,c′(n+1)+
N∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
(
c
N
)k(1−
c
N
)N−kPN+1,c′(n+k−1)
Multiplying each side by enz and summing over n = 1..N gives:
ΦN+1(z, c
′) = ezΦN (z, c)[1 +
c
N
(e−z − 1)]N
or, in terms of the cumulant-generating function ΨN :
ΨN+1(z, c(1 +
1
N
)) = z +ΨN (z, c) + ln(1 +
c
N
(e−z − 1)]N (∗)
When N →∞, an first order expansion in 1
N
gives:
ΦN+1(z, c)+
c
N
∂2ΦN+1(z, c) = e
zΦN(z, c) exp(c(e
−z − 1)[1−
c2(e−z − 1)2
N
]+o(
1
N
)
(∗∗)
where ∂2 denotes a partial derivative with respect to the second variable. The
second term on the left hand side stems from the expansion in the variable
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c′ = c(1 + 1/N) and reflects the fact that the probability for a link has to be
renormalized when going from a N-graph to a N+1 - graph.
By taking successive partial derivatives of (*) and (**) with respect to z
one can then derive recursion relation for the moments and cumulants of nc.
Let us first retrieve the result given in appendix one for nc. Define γ(c) such
that
nc =
∂φN
∂z
(0, c) = γ1(c)N +O(1)
Substituting in (*) yields a simple differential equation for γ1:
γ1(c) + cγ1
′(c) = 1− c
whose solution is γ1(c) = (1− c/2) i.e.
nc = (1−
c
2
)N +O(1)
nc
N
→ 1−
c
2
Let us now derive a similar relation for the variance σ2(N, c) = var(nc). Let
σ2(N, c) = γ2(c)N +O(1)
By taking derivatives twice with respect to z in (*) and setting z = 0 one
obtains, up to first order in 1/N :
γ2(c) + cγ2
′(c) = c
whence γ2(c) = c/2 By calculating the j-th derivative in (*) with respect
to z one can derive in the same way an asymptotic expression for the j-th
cumulant of nc:
Cj ∼
N→∞
(−1)jNc
2
Note that the asymptotic forms for cumulants of nc are identical to those
of a random variable Z with the following distribution:
P (Z = k) =
(Nc
2
)N−k
(N − k)!
e−
Nc
2
i.e. N−Z is a Poisson variable with parameter Nc/2. Without rescaling,
this distribution becomes degenerate in the large N limit. Nevertheless for
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finite N both ΦN and ΨN are analytic functions of z in a neighborhood of
zero. Consider now the rescaled variable:
YN =
nc −N(1−
c
2
)√
Nc/2
YN has zero mean and unit variance and its higher cumulants tend to zero:
∀j ≥ 3, Cj(YN) →
N→∞
0
The standard normal distribution is the only distribution with zero mean,
unit variance and zero higher cumulants. Under these conditions, one can
show [22] that the convergence of the cumulants implies convergence in dis-
tribution:
nc −N(1−
c
2
)√
Nc/2
∼
N→∞
N (0, 1)
• Appendix 4: distribution of aggregate excess demand
In this appendix we derive an equation for the generating function ofthe
variable ∆x which represents in our model the one-period return of the asset.
The relation between ∆x and other variables of the model is given by equation
(5):
∆x =
1
λ
nc∑
α=1
Wαφα =
1
λ
nc∑
α=1
Xα
where nc is the number of clusters or trading group i.e. the number of
connected components of the random graph in the context of our model. nc
is itself a random variable, whose cumulants are known in the N →∞ limit
(see Appendix 3). As for the random variables Xα, their distribution is given
by Eq.(8)
P (∆x = x) =
N∑
k=1
P (nc = k)
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
(2a)j(1− 2a)k−jf⊗j(λx)
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In order to calculate this sum, let us introduce the moment generating
functions for ∆x and X ′α:
f˜(z) =
∑
s
f(s)esz F(z) =
∑
s
P (λ∆x = s)esz
Multiplying the right hand side of the equation above by eλxz and sum-
ming over s = λx yields:
F(z) =
N∑
k=1
P (nc = k)[1− 2a+ 2af˜(z)]
k
= Φ[ln(1 + 2a(f˜(z)− 1))]
= exp[Ψ(ln(1 + 2a(f˜(z)− 1))]
where Ψ(z) is the cumulant generating function of the number of clusters
defined in appendix 3. Ψ is an analytic function whose series expansion is
given by the cumulants of nc
Ψ(z) = Nz +
Nc
2
∞∑
k=1
(−z)j
j!
= Nz +
Nc
2
(e−z − 1)
one can evaluate the above sum in the large N limit as
F(z) = exp[Ψ(ln(1 + 2a(f˜(z)− 1))]
= γN exp[
Nc
2
(
1
γ
− 1)]
where
γ = [1 + 2a(f˜(z)− 1)]
Recall that 2a corresponds to the fraction of agents who are active in
the market in a given period. Therefore 2aN is the average number of buy
and sell orders sent to the market in one period. We shall choose a(N) such
that in the limit N → ∞ the number of orders has a finite limit, which we
will denote by Norders : 2aN → Norders. More precisely if we assume that
2a = Norders/N + o(1/N) then
γN = exp[Norders(f˜(z)− 1)] +O(
1
N
)
(
1
γ
− 1) = −
Norders(f˜(z)− 1)
N
+ o(
1
N
)
29
in the above expression gives:
F(z) = γN exp[
Nc
2
(
1
γ
− 1)]
= exp[Norders(f˜(z)− 1)] exp[
−CNorders
2
(f˜(z)− 1)]
= exp[Norders(1−
c
2
)(f˜(z)− 1)] +O(
1
N
)
One finally obtains:
F(z) ≃ exp[Norder(1−
c
2
)(f˜(z)− 1)]
Let us now examine the implication of the above relation for the moments
of D and ∆x. Expanding both sides in a Taylor series yields:
µ2(D) = Norder(1−
c
2
)µ2(Xα)
µ4(D) = Norder(1−
c
2
)µ4(Xα) + 3N
2
order(1−
c
2
)2µ2(Xα)
2
which implies that the kurtosis κ(D) of the aggregate excess demand is
given by
κ(D) =
µ4(Xα)
Norder(1−
c
2
)µ2(Xα)
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